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Abstract—This work researches the impact of including a
wider range of participants in the strategy-making process on
the performance of organizations which operate in either mod-
erately or highly complex environments. Agent-based simulation
demonstrates that the increased number of ideas generated from
larger and diverse crowds and subsequent preference aggregation
lead to rapid discovery of higher peaks in the organization’s
performance landscape. However, this is not the case when the
expansion in the number of participants is small. The results
confirm the most frequently mentioned benefit in the Open
Strategy literature: the discovery of better performing strategies.
Index Terms—Open Strategy; minisum approval voting; strat-
egy as a practice; NK model; agent-based modeling.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper shows that aggregating ideas from a diverse pool
of participants using a specific aggregation mechanism leads
to rapid discovery of high performing strategies. Including a
wider range of participants in strategy-making is in line with a
recent approach to strategy development, called Open Strategy
(OS): OS is inclusive vs. restricted to the organizational elite,
transparent vs. intransparent, and enabled by social informa-
tion systems vs. merely supported by traditional IT [1]. Due to
advances in (social) technology, changing societal norms and
several benefits, the interest in Open Strategy (OS) is on the
rise [2][3].
Benefits of OS identified in empirical and conceptual re-
search are the generation of better performing strategies,
increased buy-in and commitment, increased employee moti-
vation, and improvements in an organization’s reputation [4].
Tapping into the knowledge and intuition of non-traditional
participants in the strategy process such as external stakehold-
ers and access to a broader range of ideas are mentioned as
reasons for the generation of better performing strategies. The
theory of the Wisdom of the Crowd poses similar reasoning [5].
In general there is a lack of experimental evidence on when
and how these claims might materialize, marked by calls for
more longitudinal studies [3].
This paper makes use of the strategy as a practice perspec-
tive. In contrast to the planning and process view on strategy-
making, the focus of strategy as a practice is on how the
participants in strategy development act and interact with each
other and with the organization [6]. To make sure we model
aspects relevant to a realistic OS setting, we turn to the strategy
as a practice perspective adapted to OS in [7].
The goal of this work is to contribute to a normative
understanding of the OS approach. Specifically, the aim is to
help guide academics and decision makers towards better OS
designs by evaluating if and under what conditions OS’s most
frequently mentioned benefit, the generation of better perform-
ing strategies, eventuate. This research turns to computational
experimentation with an agent-based model for the following
reasons [8]:
(a) Using empirical methods, it is impossible to disentangle
effects caused by the considered independent variables
from the effects of other influences (the environment,
competitors, the market, etc.) on the basis of obtainable
data such as from surveys and experiments, especially
for strategic decision making. Also, on this topic it is
almost impossible to carry out longitudinal studies.
(b) Formal models frequently employed in economics would
not be mathematically tractable due to their complexity.
The paper continues with a description of the model in
Section II, discusses the simulation setup and the results in
Section III, and ends with the conclusion and future work in
Section IV .
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The purpose of the model is to investigate how the manner
of aggregating participants’ preferences for strategies in an OS
approach affects an organization’s performance.
The strategy-making process is simulated in the Open
Strategy as a Practice framework introduced in [7]. The three
main components of the framework are a) the practitioners
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representing the people making strategy, b) the praxis compo-
nent standing for what actually happens in an iterative process
with the episodes taking place in a certain organizational
context, and finally c) the set of practices representing the tools
and mechanisms used to develop a strategy. When strategy-
making is open, the set of practitioners includes stakeholders
along with the firm’s upper echelon, some types of voting
mechanisms are typically part of the practices, and the praxis is
transparent by including feedback to the stakeholders involved.
The model features a single firm that seeks and implements
high performing strategies in an iterative manner. The firm
may or may not choose to include stakeholders in the strategy-
making process. It operates in a static, complex environment.
The firm is represented by its upper management and it
is always included in the simulation as P1 in the set of
practitioners {Pj : j ∈ {1, .., S}} where S is the total
number of practitioners. In an OS setting, strategy-making
also includes S − 1 ≥ 1 stakeholders from inside or outside
the firm such as employees and customers. While this work
studies the performance of strategies for the firm that are being
discovered and implemented, all practitioners are assumed
to gain a personal utility from these strategies and want to
maximize their utility.
The praxis is modeled as a cyclic process in the order
of months where each episode t ∈ {1, .., T} consists of
phases as in [7]. Hautz [9] and references therein propose that
in a strategy-making process first comes generating a range
of strategy ideas, next comes selecting the most appropriate
one, followed by implementation. Mack and Szulanski [10]
present case illustrations showing that a similar framework
can describe reality. As in [4] we distinguish the following
four phases in an episode: 1) preparation phase, 2) genera-
tion phase, 3) selection phase and 4) implementation phase.
Strategies are modeled as bitstrings s ∈ {0, 1}N consisting of
N binary decisions si, i ∈ {1, .., N}. Parameter K signifies
the number of interactions between decisions and can be
considered as a proxy for how tightly departments within
an organizations are interwoven, thereby also shaping the
complexity of the task environment [11].
In condensed form, the sequence of events is as follows
(see Figure 1): The simulation runs for T episodes with
the number of stakeholders S and the number of decision
interactions K as independent variables. In each episode, 1)
the simulation’s environment is set up in the preparation phase,
2) the practitioners come up with ideas for a new strategy, and
a preference aggregation mechanism distills these ideas to a
shortlist in the generation phase, 3) the practitioners vote for
the new strategy in the selection phase, and 4) the performance
for the firm of the new strategy is recorded as the dependent
variable in the implementation phase. The subsections below
describe the four phases and the model in more detail.
A. Preparation Phase
The firm starts with a random current strategy scur. The
simulator (the simulation software is written in Python 3.7)
also generates the practitioners’ utilities of the strategies
Fig. 1. Flow diagram of one simulation.
the firm might implement. Strategies are mapped to per-
formances for practitioners Pj in performance landscapes
Fj : {0, 1}N → [0, 1] defined by the NK model [12]. A higher
K ∈ {0, N−1} leads to rugged highly nonlinear performance
landscapes with more local peaks and vice versa, see also [13].
As all practitioners including the firm are assumed to be
correlated in their preferences toward strategies, the simula-
tion generates random performance landscapes Fj(s) with a
pairwise correlation coefficient ρ in line with [14] (with a
random interaction matrix). To account for diversity in the
pairwise correlations, the algorithm in [14] is extended to use
a perturbed correlation matrix [15].
Evaluating strategies is not without error: Assuming limited
cognitive capacity [16], practitioners’ views of their landscapes
are somewhat obfuscated. Hence, every time a practitioner Pj
evaluates a strategy s, the model adds a random error term 
from a Gaussian with mean 0 and standard deviation Ej :
Fj(s)
′ = Fj(s) + ,
 ∼ N (0, Ej).
(1)
We assume practitioners are diverse in their cognitive capaci-
ties. Consequently, at the start of a simulation we draw random
variables Dj , j ∈ {1, .., S} from a Gaussian with mean 0 and
standard deviation E and then take the absolute value of them
to obtain the individualized Ej :
Ej = |Dj |,
Dj ∼ N (0, E).
(2)
This phase takes place in episode t = 1 only, otherwise the
episode starts off with the generation phase directly.
B. Generation Phase
This phase generates a shortlist of L candidates; strategies
that can be taken into consideration in the selection phase
when practitioners vote for the firm’s strategy in t + 1. As
the firm has limited capacity for change in each episode,
appropriate candidates s for t+ 1 do not differ in more than
C decisions from scur, i.e., they have a Hamming distance
dH(s, scur) of C decisions maximum, assuming N > C.
As the first step in this phase each practitioner enters one
idea from the set of appropriate candidates for the firm’s
new strategy in t + 1 on a list of ideas. Entering ideas is
modeled as follows: Practitioners observe the firm’s current
strategy scur. Assuming limited cognitive capacity [16], each
practitioner imagines a personal random subset of only Q
strategies out of the set of appropriate candidates. They rank
these Q strategies by evaluating them one by one in their
performance landscapes. Every practitioner then enters their
preferred strategy on the list of S ideas. Duplicates may occur.
As the second and last step in this phase, the preference
aggregation mechanism minisum approval voting [17] distills
from these ideas a shortlist of L candidates for the selection
phase in this episode t. Let s be an appropriate candidate for
the firm’s strategy in t + 1 and let sj be Pj’s idea. Then
the minisum score for s equals
∑S
j=1 dH(s, sj), the sum of
Hamming distances between s and all sj . The candidates are
ranked by score (candidates with the same score are ranked
in random order) and the L lowest ranked candidates win. As
this algorithm takes the sum of distances, discontents from
single practitioners with particular candidates may have no
influence on the ranking. Therefore minisum approval voting
is a utilitarian preference aggregation mechanism.
C. Selection Phase
The shortlist of L candidates is extended by scur. The
practitioners evaluate the L + 1 candidates and communicate
their rankings to the Borda count voting rule from the set
of practices [17]. Every time a practitioner ranks a candidate
first, the candidate adds L scores to its total count. Every
practitioner’s second ranking rewards a candidate with L− 1
scores etc., with a last ranking giving zero scores. The winning
candidate snew is the candidate with the highest total count. If
there are multiple candidates with maximum total count, the
simulation picks one at random.
D. Implementation Phase
The firm communicates snew to its stakeholders and im-
plements the strategy, thereby ending episode t. The model
evaluates snew in the firm’s landscape and stores the result,
relating time step t to performance F1(s(t)) as the dependent
variable. If t < T , the simulation, skipping over the prepara-
tion phase, continues with the generation phase in t+ 1. The
winning candidate snew now has become scur in t+ 1.
III. RESULTS
The previous section presented features of the model that
are relevant when considering the impact of multiple practi-
tioners on strategy-making. The subsections below define the
simulation setup and discuss the results.
A. Simulation Setup
Table I shows the variables used in the model. Starting
with the control variables, we set N = 10 giving sufficient
combinatorial richness while not putting too much demand on
computational resources. The pairwise correlation coefficient
ρ is set to the moderate positive value of 0.5. C, the maxi-
mum Hamming distance with the current strategy that makes
a strategy a viable candidate, equals 2; while constraining
strategy updates in subsequent episodes to only 2 decisions, it
still leaves plenty of choice for practitioners to imagine ideas
as the set of appropriate candidates scales with the sum of
Binomial coefficients
(
N
k
)
with k ∈ {1, .., Q}. The number
of ideas per practitioner Q is set to 2 due to the assumption
of limited cognitive capacity [16]. The size L of the shortlist
of candidates for selection is set to 3 as to not overburden
voters in the selection phase. With E = 116 , the evaluation
error Ej will average out to a small E
√
2√
pi
≈ 0.05 as the mean
of the folded normal distribution with standard deviation E.
The number of episodes T in a simulation is set to 100 as in
all cases the results stabilize at this value.
The independent variables are K and S. The number of
decision interactions K is varied to a moderate setting, i.e., 4
and a high setting, i.e., 7 for contrast. The number of practi-
tioners S equals either 1, when strategy-making is exclusive
for the firm as in a traditional Closed Strategy setting, and 10
or 100 when stakeholders are introduced in an OS setting.
The dependent variable F1(s(t)), the performance for the
firm at time t, is recorded at the end of every episode from
t = 1 to T with F1 normalized to [0, 1]. The scenarios are
repeated 4096 times to mitigate random effects. Confidence
intervals over F1(s(t)) are calculated at 95%.
B. Simulation Results and Discussion
Figure 2 shows the performance of the firm F1(s(t)) over
one hundred episodes at the moderate level of interactions
K = 4. Included are results for S = 1, when strategy-making
is restricted to the firm as the only practitioner involved in
strategy development. When S = 10 or S = 100, strategy-
making is opened up to include an additional nine, respectively
99 practitioners, which are stakeholders of the firm. In t = 1,
just one episode after starting with a random strategy, Figure 2
shows already a significant difference between performance at
S = 1 or S = 10 on the one hand, and S = 100 on the other.
At t = 5, also the OS setting with ten practitioners starts
outperforming the closed strategy-making. Over the entire
range of episodes, S = 100 outperforms both S = 10 and
S = 1.
Fig. 2. Performance for the firm over episodes at K = 4.
TABLE I
VARIABLES.
Classification Symbol Value/Range Description
Control N 10 The number of binary decisions in a strategy s.
ρ 0.5 The average correlation coefficient between practitioners’ performance landscapes.
C 2 Maximum Hamming distance from the current strategy that makes a strategy an appropriate candidate.
Q 2 The number of strategies practitioners are able to imagine in the generation phase.
L 3 The size of the shortlist of candidates for next episode’s strategy.
Ej 0.05 Standard deviation of practitioner’s Pj evaluation error.
E 0.0625 Standard deviation of each Ej .
T 100 The number of episodes per simulation.
Independent K {4, 7} The number of interactions between decisions.
S {1, 10, 100} The number of practitioners.
Dependent F1(s(t)) [0, 1] Performance for the firm of strategy s at episode t.
Figure 3 illustrates that when K = 7, the additional
ruggedness of the landscapes produces lower performances for
all values of S as it is more difficult to find peaks with high
performing strategies for the firm. Still, S = 100 outperforms
both S = 1 and S = 10. In contrast to K = 4, with K = 7
the OS setting with ten practitioners does not significantly
outperform the Closed Strategy setting.
Fig. 3. Performance for the firm over episodes at K = 7.
The results demonstrate that in our model performance
improves or is at least the same when opening up strategy-
making for both K = 4 and K = 7, already in the initial
episodes. This finding confirms the most frequently mentioned
benefit of an OS approach: the discovery of better performing
strategies [4]. In a Closed Strategy setting the firm has access
to fewer ideas; access to a larger, diverse pool of ideas helps
in exploring the landscape faster. In a sense, an OS approach
gives a wider view, without needing to resort to uncertain big
jumps in the searching process as in [11].
The result that with higher K the advantage of an OS
approach for S = 10 seems to disappear can be explained
as follows: The theory of the Wisdom of the Crowd states
that in many discovery processes a group outperforms the
individual, even if the single person is an expert [5]. Wisdom
of the Crowd is especially effective when individual judgments
cluster around the correct central value [18]. However, even
when judgments among a wide group average to the central
value, querying a small subset of the group can have a
detrimental effect on discovery of the correct value [19]. In
our model, while the practitioners’ performance landscapes are
correlated, there is nothing that guarantees that the ”central
value” in the set of landscapes is the firm’s landscape. Our
findings suggest that when a landscape is very rugged, a small
bias can have large effects, countering the advantage of the
added number and diversity of ideas that an OS approach
can bring. Sensitivity analysis with variations in ρ confirms
the expectation that, ceteris paribus, higher correlation among
practitioners leads to higher performance.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The results suggest that the often stated benefit of an OS
approach, namely the discovery of better performing strategies
[4], can indeed be attained through preference aggregation
of a diverse group of practitioners with minisum approval
voting, even if voters’ preferences are not 100% aligned with
the firm’s preference. Also, the results indicate that a larger
group of practitioners (S = 100) outperforms a smaller group
(S = 10) in organizations operating in both moderately
(K = 4) and highly (K = 7) complex environments. With
K = 7, when it is more difficult to navigate the firm’s
landscape, the advantage of OS, at least with a smaller
number of participants, disappears due to the drawback of
practitioners’ preferences that are on average not necessarily
100% aligned with the firm’s preference.
Future work can extend the model by including network
effects among practitioners, strategic voting and the effects of
voter dissatisfaction. Further, egalitarian vs. utilitarian prefer-
ence aggregation mechanisms [20] can be evaluated for their
impact on the drawback of loss of commitment by dissatisfied
practitioners [21]. Additional work can also investigate the
apparent dilemma between the posed benefits of a broader
range of ideas [22] (high diversity in preferences) and the
requirement of low bias (low diversity) observed in this
research.
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